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Introduction
 Prior to the June 23, 2016, referendum 
vote, European Council president Donald Tusk 
told the press that a Brexit movement in the 
UK would inevitably lead to the destruction 
of Western political civilization in its entirety 
(“Donald Tusk…”). Although his statements at 
the time seemed hyperbolic, the historic move 
to hold a referendum quickly turned into a 
crusade of autarky as a campaign emerged to 
“take back control” and revert to times that 
many viewed as more prosperous and familiar. 
British voters and political parties were 
made to believe in deep atavisms of populism 
and nationalism as necessary steps to their 
country’s success. Subsequently, a war rooted 
deep in far-right ideology began between the 
citizen, the state, and the outside world. 
 The Brexit vote was historic not only due 
to the magnitude of the decision made by the 
electorate but also because it brought to surface 
salient political divisions fortified by economic 
and cultural anxiety. Brexit, at its core, was a 
populist revolt. The way proponents framed the 
discussion and subsequent vote, however, was 
through a nationalist urge. Populism revolves 
around a vertical dimension—the down 
versus the up—where a repressed people, the 
majority, oppose a corrupt elite, the minority. 
Nationalism, conversely, works on a horizontal 
scale, where the likeness of a group is essential 
to distinguish those who are in from those who 
are out. Proponents of the Leave campaign 
intricately combined these two urges during 
Brexit, arguing for a pull upward while also 
trying to navigate a horizontal plane in which 
only certain groups would benefit. Hence, the 
Leave campaign attempted to alienate the EU 
by arguing for a pull up and a simultaneous 
pull far right.
 This reasoning holds a certain amount of 
irony since Britain has always been profoundly 
internationalist. Therefore, how did the UK 
Independence Party and its Leave campaign 
manage to twist and mold that global history 
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into a basis for the isolationist nationalism 
known as Brexit? This article explores how 
the victory of the Leave campaign transcended 
traditional political ideology by rooting itself in 
strong populist and nationalist urges that date 
back to when the UK first joined the EU and even 
further back into the era of the British Empire. 
Specifically, the focus is on how proponents 
leveraged sentiment surrounding issues of 
economic inequalities and immigration to 
convince the UK to leave the EU.
What Made Great Britain Great?
 Over the span of several centuries, the 
English government became the British 
Empire through a worldwide system of 
dependencies, where colonies, protectorates, 
dominions, and other territories were brought 
under their  sovereignty  and administration. 
With 1,000 years of history deeply embedded 
into the current world system, it is imperative 
to first recognize the historical contingencies 
that originally allowed the Leave campaign to 
flourish under the guise of nostalgia. 
 For much of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, the small island 
approximately the size of California grew to 
dominate world trade and governance. At its 
peak, the British Empire was the largest empire 
in history and held the position of global 
superpower more times than not. In 1916, the 
British Empire represented 412 million people: 
25% of both the population of the world and 
the total land area of Earth (Wrong, p. 46). 
The hegemony became a microcosm of the 
world itself that included people of every race 
and creed. Hence, the phrase “the sun never 
sets on the British Empire” was often used to 
describe its far-flung nature for the very reason 
that British nationalism was anchored to the 
empire, either by expansion of war, trade, or 
religion (Wrong, p. 48). 
 As the British gained prominence 
economically, politically, and culturally, the 
empire became a vehicle for nationalism 
as its success abroad translated to pride 
and glory at home. Such a legacy does not 
dissipate overnight. Although the British 
Empire eventually dissolved into autonomous 
sovereign states, patriotism and love for a 
united kingdom did not fade away. In fact, 
it led to many of the difficulties the British 
government encountered when faced with 
the decision to join the EU in the twentieth 
century.
The Awkward Partner
 By the 1960s, years after the peak of the 
British Empire, the economy in continental 
Europe was performing much better than the 
UK’s (Menon and Salter, p. 1299). Due to a 
historical desire to outpace West Germany and 
France and to prove British exceptionalism 
once again, the UK applied to join the EU in 
1961. It was promptly denied, with French 
leader Charles de Gaulle denouncing any 
idea of negotiations on the matter. A second 
application in 1963 was again denied by the 
French. It was not until eight years after the 
UK’s first application that unanimous consent 
from member nations allowed negotiations for 
British membership to begin. The UK officially 
became a part of the EU in 1973.
 Labeled infamously the “awkward 
partner,” the British regularly negotiated 
privileged positions of opting out of areas in 
which they had no interest: Protocol 25 of 
the Maastricht Treaty exempted the UK from 
participation in the euro; Protocol 36 of the 
Lisbon Treaty exempted the UK from European 
fundamental rights legislation regarding 
home affairs and justice; and Article 4 of the 
Schengen Agreement exempted the UK from 
abolished border controls between member 
states. From the beginning, the EU’s awkward 
partner carved out an advantaged position for 
itself, shaping a Europe congruent with its own 
preferences (Menon and Salter, p. 1298).
 Still, the relationship between the UK 
and the EU remained a necessary partnership. 
Britain needed Europe to ensure economic 
stability, especially since the continent is one of 
Britain’s highest export destinations. In 2016, 
44% of the UK’s exports in goods and services 
went to countries in the EU (Ward, p. 5). At 
the same time, the EU often felt the benefits 
of London as one of the world’s top financial 
capitals, with more than a fifth of Europe’s 500 
largest companies headquartered in the capital 
(Ward, p. 6).
 No matter the mutually beneficial 
symbiotic relationship, Euroscepticism weaved 
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itself into British public discourse constantly. 
In fact, critics characterized the very notion 
of Britain joining a federalized Europe back in 
1973 as “the end of a thousand years of history” 
(Menon and Salter, p. 1301). Over time (explored 
in detail later), a majority of the British 
electorate grew to view the EU as an imposing 
foreign entity that forced them to surrender 
their sovereignty and therefore their historic 
nationhood. Subsequently, deep grievances 
culminated across the island as political parties 
began to argue that withdrawal from the EU, 
rather than continued membership, would be 
more in line with expressed British identity.
UK Independence Party and Brexit
 Right-wing Eurosceptic discourse found 
a voice in the UK Independence Party (UKIP), 
a party whose sole existence was to promote a 
British populist and nationalist agenda. UKIP 
rose to dominance with many British citizens 
starting to reject conventional parties and a 
broader political establishment that had too 
long ignored both their economic and cultural 
concerns.
 Originally formed in 1991 as the Anti-
Federalist League, the single-issue Eurosceptic 
party was primarily led by the well-known 
Nigel Farage, a member of Parliament of the 
southeast England constituency. Farage grew 
the party under his leadership by attempting 
to influence the government’s decisions on 
immigration and EU involvement. Hence, when 
Prime Minister David Cameron attempted to 
settle an internal party dispute by promising a 
national referendum on EU membership, UKIP 
naturally found its way into public discourse. 
 In January 2013, Cameron promised 
the public a simple Brexit ballot regarding 
continued EU membership, yet complex and 
emotional political campaigns ensued. The 
Remain side focused mainly on economic 
stability, citing that Britain would be “stronger, 
safer, and better off” in the EU (Menon and 
Salter, p. 1307). The campaign painted leaving 
the EU as a leap into a dark abyss of unknown 
that would inevitably hurt British economic 
prosperity. The City of London agreed, with 
business leaders from almost 200 companies 
signing a letter arguing against Brexit a mere 
24 hours after Cameron’s original statement on 
the referendum (Williams-Grut). On the other 
hand, the Leave side, led by Farage’s UKIP, 
campaigned heavily by leveraging politics of fear 
with simple and powerful nationalist messages. 
Signs stating, “I want my country back” and 
“take back control,” were plastered across 
towns in the UK. The campaign represented an 
equivocation for a loss of national power, as the 
Leave camp grounded its message in nostalgia 
for some version of a successful British past.
 During the course of the Brexit campaign, 
the Leave campaigners regularly attacked the 
Remain campaign by employing many shock 
and awe public crusades. Farage and UKIP 
falsely claimed that European migrants were 
using the National Health Service (NHS) for 
expensive HIV treatment, told the president of 
the European Council Herman Van Rompuy 
that he had the “charisma of a damp rag” and 
the “appearance of a low-grade bank clerk,” 
and famously broadcasted a red bus stating 
that Britain gave Brussels hundreds of millions 
of pounds a week (“Nigel Farage Insults…”). 
Even after Farage’s plane crashed due to a 
UKIP promotional banner becoming entangled 
in the plane’s propellers, the UKIP leader was 
dedicated to removing the UK entirely from 
the EU—in an interview with local media, he 
said the plane crash made him “more driven 
than [he ever] was before” (“The Nigel Farage 
Story”).
 Farage, however, was no catch-all 
nationalist; his appeal was concentrated in 
specific groups and was utterly alien to others. 
The Guardian reported that UKIP had virtually 
no support among the financially secure and 
the middle-aged university graduates who 
dominated politics and the media. Essentially, 
UKIP hosted a revolt dominated by “white faces, 
blue collars, and gray hair”; support was weak 
among women, white-collar professionals, 
and the young, while ethnic minority voters 
shunned the party totally (Goodwin and Ford). 
 UKIP was not just a political party. They 
were a symptom of far deeper social and value 
divisions in Britain. The eventual results of 
the Brexit vote—52% Leave to 48% Remain—
brought to surface these deep divides in the 
electorate: young versus old, rural versus 
urban, college educated versus those without 
degrees, rich versus poor, and white versus 
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non-white. The manner in which UKIP framed 
its Leave campaign—through an intricate 
weaving of populist and nationalist threads—
exacerbated these divisions. The following 
sections explain how economic inequalities 
and immigration worry were used as vehicles 
to scapegoat the EU, the differentiating factor 
separating the then-glory from the now.
Those Left Behind Vote for Change
 The roots of the populist revolt can be 
traced back over decades. Divides in economic 
experiences left large segments of British 
voters on the wrong side of developmental 
change. Many Leave voters struggled with 
stagnant incomes, felt threatened by the way 
their communities were changing, and became 
furious at established political parties that 
appeared not to understand or even care about 
their concerns (Goodwin and Ford). Together, 
these factors alienated particular communities, 
specifically those who benefited the most 
from the heyday of labor-intensive industry 
and postwar social democracy. According 
to the Institute for Public Policy Research 
Commission on Economic Justice, half of all 
households in the UK have seen no meaningful 
improvement in their incomes for more than 
a decade (IPPR’s…, p. 2). The fact that only 
London and the southeast region of the UK 
have fully recovered from the 2008 financial 
crisis ostracizes rural areas that have not seen 
that type of economic recovery at all. Only a 
fifth of the public think that the way the British 
economy works is fair, with average workers’ 
pay dramatically decreasing while directors of 
companies’ pay is increasing by more than 47% 
(Schmitt et al., p. 74). 
 Polarized living standards and varied 
economic lifestyles thus followed citizens into 
the ballot box. Studies of exit polls made by the 
British Election Study find that nearly 49% 
of semi-skilled workers, unskilled workers, 
and those reliant on state welfare payments 
voted to leave the EU due to economic anxiety 
(Schmitt et al.). A similar study by the British 
Social Attitudes team found that 80% of those 
with a higher education degree voted to remain 
whereas those with a General Certificate of 
Secondary Education or less voted to remain 
by only 30% (National Centre for Social 
Research). This demographic pattern reflects 
an educational divide, as well as a social 
class divide, that exists in voting patterns. 
These types of vertical divides combined 
with economic decline typically incentivize 
domestic political turnover, yet British citizens 
took their own country’s economic struggles 
and began to push the blame horizontally onto 
a susceptible foreign scapegoat: the EU.
 UKIP attempted to create an economic 
enemy out of the EU by leading voters to 
believe that Britain was somehow subsidizing 
the rest of Europe. Farage’s red bus stating, 
“we send the EU £350 million a week; let’s fund 
our NHS instead,” made its way from town to 
town during the Brexit campaign (“The Nigel 
Farage Story”). Its plastered cry to “take back 
control” by voting to leave the EU insinuated 
that Britain was no longer benefiting from its 
historic mercantilist model and instead needed 
to turn inward for economic success. Nationalist 
impulse couched in populist concerns dates 
back approximately five centuries, when the 
Discourse of the Common Weal of this Realm 
of England touted that Britain “must always 
take heed that we buy no more from strangers 
than we sell them, for so should we impoverish 
ourselves and enrich them” (Stafford). The 
Leave campaign attempted to showcase that 
Brussels and the EU were enriching themselves 
while impoverishing those in the UK. The 
apparent lack of autarky fueled the anger 
behind economic inequalities and drove those 
who were economically disenfranchised to the 
ballot box in droves.
 Those who find themselves at the sharp 
end of a series of economic changes and 
stress unsurprisingly arrive at an antagonistic 
political self-identification that is couched 
in negative cultural reaction. UKIP benefited 
from this populist insurgency by channeling 
voters’ frustrations and promising a populist 
pull upward. Yet populism, by definition, pits a 
virtuous and homogenous people against a set 
of elites or dangerous others who are together 
depicted as depriving the sovereign people 
of their rights, values, prosperities, identity, 
and voices (Albertazzi and McDonnell, p. 2). 
Farage won over these voters because they felt 
left behind by Britain’s rapid economic and 
social transformation (as shown by the British 
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Election Study) but he still needed to navigate 
the nationalist’s horizontal plane of strictly 
outlining who is included in that definition of 
“virtuous and homogenous people.” Therefore, 
although voters may have found an economic 
voice in UKIP, they needed to find a “dangerous 
other” to exclude from the nationalist 
narrative, and they found the perfect contender 
in immigrants from the EU.
The Dangerous Other
 UKIP argued for Great Britain to become 
“great” again not by removing economic 
hierarchies or by redressing the economic 
injustices suffered by many in rural areas but 
by shifting blame for all ills onto the foreign 
other. For UKIP, the scapegoat for this type 
of thinking was often immigrants, especially 
from the EU. The political party used language, 
such as “spiraling,” “floodgates,” “besieging,” 
and “swamping,” to describe outsiders who 
had infiltrated their society and threatened 
the majority’s rights (Seaton). This idea of a 
persecuted majority fuels a type of majoritarian 
nationalism that claims the UK is under siege 
by enemies and must be “taken back.”
 UKIP normalized its politics of fear and 
exclusion by representing it as a defensive 
reaction to the threats supposedly posed by 
European immigrants to the security of the 
nation as well as the collective British identity. 
The most effective way UKIP broadcasted 
these nationalist messages was through media 
discourse, which was 75% anti-European 
(Seaton). Having the British press at UKIP’s 
defense changed the dynamic of the Brexit 
vote, especially with issues of immigration. 
The readers of the Daily Mail, the Telegraph, 
and the Sun received intense Leave persuasion 
and accounted for four times as many readers 
than the Guardian, the Independent, and the 
Financial Times, which published opinion 
articles mainly supporting a Remain vote 
(Martinson). Therefore, anti-European 
rhetoric found its way into almost every 
headline on newspaper stands: the Express 
featured a story claiming that “half of all rape 
and murder suspects in some parts of Britain 
are foreigners” (Sheldrick) and the Daily 
Mail included a headline saying that “More 
Than 30,000 Europeans a Year Are Arrested in 
London” (Doyle). 
 If these portrayed criminal immigrants 
were not stealing physical materials from 
British citizens, they were presumably stealing 
their benefits. The Express claimed that “the 
average family of unskilled migrants cost the 
UK £30,000 a year, once tax, public service 
use, and benefit payments are considered” yet 
the report produced by the Express did not 
balance their research with the positive effects 
that migrants have on public finance and how 
economically beneficial they are to the country 
as a whole (Ruhs and Vargas-Silva). A study by 
an Oxford University Migration Observatory 
research team found that in reality there is 
no significant impact on unemployment or 
average wages for British citizens by overall 
immigration into the UK (Ruhs and Vargas-
Silva). (Katherine Wu’s article in this volume 
of Perspectives further explores how incorrect 
UKIP’s presented statistics on immigration 
were.) Nevertheless, demographic warfare 
continued as UKIP successfully bracketed 
millions of immigrants into a single identity, 
demonizing a collective group as the “other” 
and constantly painting them as a people beyond 
an average British person’s understanding.
 This type of purposeful attack on 
immigrants had a profound effect. Studies 
conducted by British Social Attitudes found 
that issues associated with citizens’ sense of 
national identity and cultural outlook were 
significantly associated with vote choice. 
The study found that 73% of those who saw 
immigration as a “growing concern to Great 
Britain’s culture and identity” voted to leave 
the EU (National Centre…). Furthermore, the 
perceived identity of those polled also made a 
difference in response. The study found that 
no less than 92% of British citizens who said 
they identified as European wanted Britain to 
continue to be a member of the EU. On the 
other hand, those who identified as strictly 
English, rather than British or European, had 
great support for leaving the EU (National 
Centre…). Remain voter Beverly David told 
the study that “people in London have a 
different identity. We are Londoners first, then 
European, then British” (National Centre…). 
With some London boroughs voting close to 
80% Remain, it is easy to see how identity—
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whether foreign or native—made a difference 
in the attitudes of voters. After the vote results 
came out, British citizen Julius Beltrame said, 
“I’ve never felt less British and more Londoner” 
(National Centre…).
 Similarly illustrative of the central 
importance to the Brexit outcome of national 
identity and anti-outsider attitudes, the British 
Election Study created a word cloud of the 
language used by survey respondents about the 
reasons for their vote preferences (Figure 1). 
The size of the text reflects the relative number 
of times Leave voters used each word when 
answering, “What matters most to you when 
deciding how to vote in the EU referendum?” 
The findings show extraordinary consistency. 
Immigration leads the list by a long margin, 
followed by control, country, sovereignty, laws, 
and borders (Prosser et al.). 
 At the core of UKIP’s identity politics 
was a movement in search of a homogenous 
Britain. Alarmed by the perceived downfalls 
of heterogeneity and hybridity, nationalists 
in the party crafted a narrative of us-versus-
them that would eventually reconfigure the 
island as narrowly British while alienating 
those who did not fit their version of expressed 
British identity. UKIP knew the importance of 
aliens and outsiders to the formation of group 
consciousness; it had existed throughout 
history. Even Winston Churchill’s son touted 
that “immigration has to be halted to defend 
the British way of life” (Storry and Childs). As a 
result, UKIP and other nationalist parties could 
easily reimagine the nation’s self-identity by 
promoting the deep, horizontal comradeship 
that only common language, culture, and 
customs can arouse in British citizens. By 
directing the electorate’s economic and populist 
grievances to the dangerous other, embodied 
by the EU, UKIP fostered a nationalist culture 
that no longer resided only in the domain of the 
far-right. The party brought nationalism from 
the fringes to the mainstream, continuing to 
purposefully alienate the EU through negative 
narratives of immigration that amplified 
economically rooted populist angst.
The Difficulties of Creating  
a “Truly Global Britain”
 Populist and nationalist sentiment 
surrounding economic inequalities and 
immigration was not left at the ballot box 
after Brexit. Half a year after the vote, newly 
appointed Prime Minister Theresa May has 
attempted to maneuver the complicated 
waters between a “hard” or “soft” Brexit in 
the midst of bitter civic and political opinions 
that plague negotiations and planning for the 
Figure 1
Word Cloud of What Mattered Most to Leave Voters
Source: Prosser et al.
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implementation of the UK’s exit from the EU. 
May has tried to convey to the nation that the 
result of the referendum was not a decision to 
turn inward and retreat from the world but 
rather was “the moment the country chose to 
build a truly global Britain” (Department for 
Exiting the European Union). Although she 
said the UK is proud of its European heritage, 
she claimed that the nation has always been a 
country that has looked beyond Europe and 
to the wider world because “Britain’s history 
and culture is profoundly internationalist” 
(Department for Exiting the European Union). 
Indeed, over several centuries, havens for 
British ideology have existed all over the 
world, whether through imperial, religious, 
or economic expansion. Still, can the UK 
actually become a global Britain post-Brexit 
as May hopes the country to become? How 
does a country position itself to become more 
globally oriented when populist and nationalist 
sentiment drove the country to become more 
isolationist in the first place? 
 Furthermore, May wants to create this new 
and equal partnership between Europe and an 
independent, self-governing, global Britain that 
is “strong, confident and united at home,” yet 
the UK is still strongly divided. The Brexit vote 
exacerbated the social and cultural divisions in 
British society, leaving the path ahead of May 
riddled with hurdles to overcome—politically, 
socially, and economically. Politically, the 
British Social Attitudes team found that 
both the Conservative and the Labour parties 
were virtually equally split on the issue of 
leaving the EU, whereas the UKIP base voted 
by almost 100% to leave the EU (National 
Centre…, p. 86). How will negotiations play 
out internationally in Brussels if domestically 
parliamentarians cannot agree on the merits 
of the very decision they are negotiating? 
Socially, 75% of voters under the age of 30 
voted for a future in Europe whereas 61% 
over the age of 65 voted against (National 
Centre…, p. 12). How can the ideological 
differences between the varying age groups be 
reconciled? Economically, May must also take 
into consideration the parliamentary concerns 
of Scotland, which voted overwhelmingly to 
stay in the single market of the EU. All aspects 
considered, inherent populist and nationalist 
sentiment may serve as restrictions to limit the 
scope of May’s globalist goals for negotiations.
No Island Is an Island,  
Entire of Itself
 In June 1940, the Evening Standard 
published a comic by David Low on its front 
page. The drawing depicted a heroically isolated 
British solider on the White Cliffs of Dover, 
fighting against vicious waves of the channel, 
and featured a three-word caption: “Very Well, 
Alone” (Low). The cartoon was commenting 
on the fall of France to Nazi Germany and 
the prospect of a war that could end in either 
“surrender, starvation, or subjugation”; 
nevertheless, the soldier stood tall…and alone.
 This type of national resoluteness 
resurfaced in the Brexit vote. Popular culture, 
politics, and economics have always boasted a 
“finest hour” reflex in British history, but the 
bouts of populist and nationalist morale present 
in the Brexit vote took the world by surprise. 
A barrage of disapproval emanated from the 
international community: one Swiss newspaper 
asked, “What in the world has happened to this 
country?” (Zaschke); a German radio station 
called Brexit the “biggest political nonsense 
since the Roman emperor Caligula decided to 
appoint his horse Incitatus as consul” (Boland); 
Japanese media called Britain an “outcast”; 
Poland depicted the nation as “an offended, 
spoiled child” (Cortazzi); Pakistan headlines 
described the British lion as possessing “more 
of a moan than a roar” (Husain); and another 
German newspaper called the UK “the laughing 
stock of the world” (Stephens). A nation once 
lauded by its neighbors for its relentless and 
impenetrable steadiness now struggles to 
keep May’s promise of becoming a “strong and 
stable” UK. 
 As argued, the victory of the Leave 
campaign in Britain was underpinned by 
economic and cultural anxiety that transcended 
traditional ideological lines. The aversion to 
international bodies such as the EU was based 
on populist and nationalist tribalism, drawing 
on the perception of nationhood, sovereignty, 
and the need to protect historic British 
identity. Although UKIP and other right-wing 
parties often caricaturized complex realities, 
they essentially sold a romantic and exclusive 
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Downton Abbey age of economic prosperity 
and traditional values. The problem that May 
must face now, however, is how to take those 
anxieties and channel them into a successful 
Brexit negotiation. UKIP promised a UK that 
would benefit from a populist’s pull upward 
economically and a nationalist’s pull to the right 
culturally. May will most certainly struggle 
to keep that promise, especially if it means 
fundamentally restructuring her government 
to aid the electorate economically while also 
alienating the EU from those benefits.
 There are only 20 miles of water separating 
the White Cliffs of Dover from continental 
Europe. The next two years of negotiations on 
Brexit will determine whether or not that 20-
mile stretch completely severs the island from 
the proximate continent. In an ever-increasing 
globalized world, Britain will soon ask itself 
whether or not an island can truly be an island, 
entire of itself, alone.
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